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Public Funding and the Road to 
Damascus: The Legacy of 
Employment Division v. Smith 
he loom of fate weaves human lives together for reasons we cannot 
understand. Consider that Alfred Leo Smith Jr., an alcohol and 
drug abuse counselor, Native American activist, and sobriety advocate, 
died on November 19, 2014, at the age of ninety-five;1 less than six 
months later, Smith’s most unyielding antagonist, former Oregon 
attorney general and University of Oregon president Dave Frohnmayer, 
died at seventy-four.2 
Their direct conflict ended in 1990, when, having lost repeatedly 
below, Dave Frohnmayer on the second try persuaded a majority of the 
Supreme Court that the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
did not require Oregon to pay unemployment compensation to two drug 
and alcohol abuse counselors (one of whom was Al Smith) who had 
taken part in a peyote ritual conducted by the Native American Church. 
In Employment Division v. Smith, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote for the 
Court that the “free exercise of religion” clause of the Constitution 
provided no protection for a minority religious group whose practice 
was burdened, or even outlawed altogether, by a “neutral, generally 
applicable law,” meaning one that did not target religion as such.3 
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1 Denise K. Lajimodiere, Obituary, Alfred Leo Smith, KLAMATH TRIBES NEWS & 
EVENTS (Dec. 23, 2014), http://klamathtribes.org/news/alfred-leo-smith/. 
2 Garrett Epps, The Man Who Wrestled Death to a Draw, ATLANTIC (Mar. 15, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/the-man-who-wrestled-death-to-a        
-drw/387760/. 
3 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990). 
T
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Majority hostility could not justify such a ban; simple ignorance or 
indifference, however, could. This was a surprising ruling. Neither 
party to the case had briefed or argued it,4 and the Court had given no 
hint it was considering it—displaced a test known as “the Sherbert 
test,” which stated that a governmental regulation that “substantially 
burdened” religious practice must be “narrowly tailored” to further a 
“compelling” governmental interest.5 
Smith was a famous victory, but not since the Greek general Pyrrhus 
“won” the battle of Asculum in 279 BCE6 has a victory proved so 
hollow. Indeed, it may be that, in the long history of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, no case has been legislatively repudiated as many times as 
Smith. Frohnmayer was bitterly criticized in his home state for his 
insistence on pursuing the Smith case to this conclusion. The Oregon 
legislature almost immediately passed legislation protecting peyote 
worship from criminal prosecution.7 The U.S. Congress passed not one, 
not two, but three statutes to erase what were seen as the ill effects of 
Smith—the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, which 
reinstated the “compelling governmental interest” test for Free 
Exercise challenges to “neutral generally applicable law”;8 the 
American Indian Free Exercise of Religion Amendments of 1994, 
which threw a statutory blanket over Native American adherents of the 
 
4 To be strictly correct, the State of Oregon did suggest a similar rule in its first petition 
for certiorari in the Smith saga, which suggested to the Court that the existing “compelling 
state interest” test for Free Exercise claims might need to be abandoned as a “false step.” 
See GARRETT EPPS, TO AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 149 (2001) 
(quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 485 
U.S. 660 (1988) (Nos. 86-946, 86-947)). However, the State did not pursue that argument 
in its briefs for Smith. That change of strategy came as a result of urgent advice from 
Professor Jesse Choper, Frohnmayer’s former teacher and mentor, that the Court was not 
ready to abandon the “compelling state interest” test. See id. at 149–50. The State returned 
to that suggestion in its second petition for certiorari in Smith, suggesting that the Court hold 
that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause does not require government to exempt religious peyote or 
other drug use from valid and neutral criminal laws of general applicability.” Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon at *12, Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(No. 88-1213) 1989 WL 1174056. However, Oregon abandoned this argument again after 
the grant of certiorari and placed its case squarely within the “compelling interest” test. See 
id. 
5 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see also Hobbie v. Unemployment Comm’n, 
480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
6 DAVID MATZ, VOICES OF ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME: CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS 
OF DAILY LIFE xxiii (2012). 
7 OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992 (1991) (currently codified at OR. REV. STAT. 475.752 
(2015)). 
8 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012). 
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Native American Church, protecting it from federal and state law;9 and 
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 
which—after the Supreme Court had held that RFRA could not be 
applied against the states10—reimposed on state governments specific 
religious-freedom guarantees that protected both churches in zoning 
disputes and inmates in state prison seeking accommodation of 
religious practice.11 Finally, the Smith decision triggered enactment of 
twenty-one state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, requiring courts 
to use the “compelling interest” test in state courts when challengers 
seek exemptions to laws or regulations that burden their religion.12 
Its aftereffects do not diminish with time, but rather grow. In fact, 
the current constitutional dialogue in many ways is a series of footnotes 
to Smith. Consider that the Court’s most consequential religious-
freedom decision, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., extended the 
“compelling interest” test of RFRA to give a for-profit corporation 
operating a chain of craft stores a “free exercise” right to refuse to give 
its employees statutorily mandated contraceptive coverage, on the 
grounds that the stockholders of the firm objected to some medically 
approved methods.13 Consider that Zubik v. Burwell, one of the most 
divisive cases on the Court’s October 2015 docket, seeks to employ 
RFRA to allow “religious corporations”—that is, nonprofit 
corporations with a distinctly religious mission—to refuse even to sign 
a government form that would allow their employees to receive 
contraceptive coverage at no cost to, and with no participation by, the 
nonprofit itself.14 And finally, consider that the decision in Obergefell 
v. Hodges, in which the Court held that states cannot refuse to 
recognize and celebrate the marriages of same-sex couples, has set off 
a new front in the culture wars—a claim that being required to treat 
same-sex couples as legally married is a “substantial burden” on the 
 
9 American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-344, 
108 Stat. 3125 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1996a). 
10 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
11 Protection of Religious Exercise in Land Use and by Institutionalized Persons Act of 
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 806 (2000) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2012)). 
12 NCSL State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES 
(Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes 
.aspx. 
13 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
14 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Zubik v. Burwell, 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015) (Nos. 14-
418, 15-191). 
EPPS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/2016  8:47 AM 
662 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94, 659 
religious freedom of business owners and employers.15 That claim, in 
fact, has now reached the point that government officials are 
demanding—and winning—the right to discriminate in the provision 
of services on the basis of sexual orientation. 
In other words, the afterlife of Smith is a world in which individuals 
may wield at once the power of the state and the selectivity of 
individual conscience; the rights of conscience of minorities—women 
who seek contraception, or same-sex couples who seek marriage 
licenses—are to be subordinated to the religious practice of those who 
hold legal or economic authority. 
It is a melancholy development, and one that I suspect Frohnmayer 
would not welcome. 
Dave Frohnmayer was my friend, my dean, and my historical 
subject—an unusual and possibly explosive combination. My book, To 
an Unknown God: Religious Freedom on Trial, is a history of the case 
now known as Employment Division, Oregon Department of Human 
Resources. v. Smith—but which in justice should have been entitled 
Dave Frohnmayer v. Al Smith.16 Before I published the book, I allowed 
each man to read its manuscript, in order to catch factual mistakes and 
permit them an opportunity to explain any of their actions that I might 
have misconstrued or misreported. This kind of review is often a tense 
proceeding. The subjects sometimes react badly to an outsider’s 
assessment of their conduct. But Frohnmayer had only one modest 
cavil about the book. In the book’s Prologue, I wrote of a moment just 
before oral argument in Smith, in which Frohnmayer realized that to 
the Native people in the audience at the Court, he and the State of 
Oregon were viewed as bitter, implacable enemies.17 “How did we get 
to be the Indian bashers?” he asked his cocounsel, Deputy Attorney 
General Bill Gary.18 
It was a foretaste of the understanding that would come to him 
slowly, over the months and years after the Court’s decision, that . . . 
[Smith] would become in a way the meaning of Frohnmayer’s public 
career. It would be what lawyers and laypeople remembered when 
 
15 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015). 
16 EPPS, supra note 4. The audio and video materials I collected, along with primary 
documents available nowhere else and transcripts of extensive interviews with principals of 
the case, are in the University of Oregon Library. They have not been processed or 
catalogued, but are available to scholars. Garrett Epps Papers (unpublished materials) (on 
file with University of Oregon Special Collections and University Archives, accession 
number 01.072.M) (four boxes). 
17 Id. at 5–6. 
18 Id. at 6. 
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they heard his name. Nothing he had done, nothing he would do, 
would loom larger in the memory of history than this day’s work.19 
Frohnmayer rather mournfully protested this passage. What about 
his work as president of the University of Oregon? He asked. His work 
as dean of the University of Oregon Law School, pulling the institution 
back from the verge of collapse? 
What about his work during the Rajneesh crisis of 1981–1985? 
I stood by my characterization of his career then; I think it is more 
than vindicated by subsequent events. Smith changed the course of the 
law in ways that no one at the time could have foreseen. Frohnmayer 
did not want these changes; he did not foresee them; but he set events 
in motion—and on several occasions kept them in motion when it 
seemed that they might stop—that at first tore a hole in the existing 
structure of Free Exercise doctrine and then replaced it with a fix that 
becomes more problematic every year. 
But Frohnmayer was right to mention the Rajneesh affair. That 
episode did not rival his work in Smith in importance; properly viewed 
from the point of view of history, it was, instead, a part of Smith itself. 
Had there been no Rajneeshpuram, there might not have been the 
absolute determination on the part of the Oregon Attorney General’s 
office to litigate and relitigate two modest unemployment claims until 
the dispute swelled into a landmark, and deeply problematic, decision. 
Let us quickly review the Rajneesh affair.20 In 1981, a Hindu holy 
man who styled himself Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh sent a disciple to buy 
a huge ranch near the town of Antelope in rural eastern Oregon. The 
cult had been driven out of its previous home, in Poona, India, by 
authorities who objected to Rajneesh’s heterodox Hinduism and 
particularly to his permissive view of sexual activity by his European 
followers. (While the commune was still in Poona, the director of the 
Esalen Institute wrote to Rajneesh protesting its use of psychological 
manipulation and sexual license: “It is as if the worst mistakes of some 
inexperienced Esalen group leaders of many years ago had been 
systematized and given the stamp of ‘God,’” he wrote.)21 The 
disciple—her commune name was Ma Anand Sheela—contracted to 
purchase Big Muddy Ranch near the tiny town of Antelope, Oregon, 
 
19 Id. 
20 The account that follows is drawn largely from “East of Eden,” Chapter Four of EPPS, 
supra note 4, at 66–89. 
21 Id. at 68. 
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“on the west side of the John Day River as it passes through Wasco and 
Jefferson Counties in the Oregon high desert.”22 
The Rajneeshees, or “sanyassin,” apparently believed that the vast 
emptiness of their new 64,000-acre empire would offer them room to 
build a city of God in the desert. They are not the first pilgrims to the 
West to conclude that the wide open spaces there will allow them to 
live out their fantasies without human interference—to mistake, as I 
have written elsewhere, “distance for vacancy.”23 In fact, in part 
because of the fragile nature of Oregon’s deserts and watercourses, the 
state has some of the strictest land-use regulations in the nation. When 
Rajneesh and his followers unveiled plans to build a conference center 
and a hotel, along with a permanent residential development, on the 
ranch, they were stopped dead by the state’s Land Conservation and 
Development Commission. Rural areas, they discovered, cannot be the 
sites of such development—unless they are within the “urban growth 
boundary” of an incorporated city. They responded by taking over the 
government of Antelope (thus gaining the benefit of its “urban growth 
boundary”), and by winning approval from the Wasco County Board 
of Commissioners to incorporate the ranch itself as another city, to be 
called “Rajneeshpuram.” That victory alarmed a member of the state 
legislature, who asked the Attorney General’s office for a formal 
opinion whether the town’s incorporation—and its unique 
organization—violated the state or federal constitutions.24 
In the opinion, Frohnmayer recapped the unusual status of the city 
of Rajneeshpuram. All the property inside the “city” limits was owned 
by a private nonprofit corporation controlled by the sect. Only members 
of the sect were permitted to live inside the city limits. The city 
maintained its right to close both private and public roadways inside 
city limits to all but residents and invited guests. In addition, the city 
maintained a state-funded police force under control of the corporation 
and entirely staffed by Rajneesh devotees. 
The question, then, was whether payment of state funds to the city 
for police and other purposes was “in violation of Art I, § 5 and the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”25 Frohnmayer’s 
answer was yes; and beyond that, fatefully, he wrote that “the very 
incorporation and continued existence of such a city under the facts 
 
22 Id. at 69. 
23 Garrett Epps, Meanness in This World, 14 WIDENER L.J. 847, 847 (2005). 
24 44 Op. Or. Att’y Gen. 20, 22 (1983). 
25 Id. at 21. 
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assumed is a violation of the Establishment Clause, and possibly also 
of the Oregon Constitution.”26 
The opinion brought Frohnmayer into the field as the most 
dangerous and tenacious enemy of the Rajneesh cult. From then until 
the dissolution of the city in 1985, Frohnmayer was, to Rajneesh and 
his followers, Public Enemy Number One. When I interviewed him a 
decade and a half later, he remained possessive and proud of the 
opinion. 
Here is the important language: 
 American history chronicles the experience of lonely minorities 
seeking refuge from religious persecution. Liberty of conscience and 
belief is not merely an abstract icon of our constitutional guarantees, 
state and federal. The Mayflower Compact sealed the promises of a 
religious minority consenting to a system of civil government. Roger 
William[s] and other dissenters from the New England Puritan 
establishment fled to Rhode Island to protect their fundamental 
beliefs, and to establish a society without an established church. 
Brigham Young and his Mormon followers made history in a 
pilgrimage to a frontier affording protection from oppression. The 
spartan Amish lifestyle has been guarded from improper state 
intrusions. Thousands of Jewish refugees from Hitler’s death camps 
came to these shores and enriched our culture. The constitutional 
battle for private Catholic education—ultimately resolved by the 
United States Supreme Court—was fought against the 
governmentally enforced bigotry of the Ku Klux Klan five decades 
ago in this very state. All these experiences reinforce the commitment 
of this nation’s founders to protection of the free exercise of religion. 
Tolerance is not merely a moral virtue; it is a matter of constitutional 
policy. 
 But the very diversity of beliefs and convictions which led the 
authors of the Bill of Rights to protect religious liberty generated a 
parallel constitutional restriction. Neither the United States 
government nor that of the State of Oregon may create a state religion 
or an established government church. This restriction in favor of 
governmental religious neutrality obviously extends to political 
subdivisions such as cities, counties and school boards. 
 We need look no further than the contemporary civil strife of 
Ireland, Iran, and Lebanon to grasp the historic wisdom of the 
prohibition against state-sponsored religion. A tragic price in human 
bloodshed has been paid whenever government has claimed the right 
to construct the exclusive thoroughfare to spiritual redemption. Our 
legal system requires that the pathway to religion be private and 
internal to each pilgrim’s mind and soul. The state and federal 
 
26 Id. 
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constitutions do not permit the road to Damascus to be paved with 
public funds.27 
This is probably the best single statement of Dave Frohnmayer’s 
view of church and state. The focus is the use of public authority by 
private religious individuals or groups. But state power, and state 
funding, were precisely what Rajneesh and his followers demanded. 
Having gotten a taste of it from the incorporation of Rajneeshpuram, 
they proceeded to act out a kind of cautionary drama depicting the 
hazards of religious power. In 1983, the Rajneesh took control of the 
Antelope City Council and changed the name of the town to Rajneesh. 
The new government 
renamed all the city streets after Hindu holy men, raised taxes in an 
apparent attempt to drive out the old-line residents, and filed a lawsuit 
to gain control of an Episcopal church that had been restored by 
volunteers as a community center. . . . [T]he new council majority 
also contracted out the town’s police service to the Rajneesh Peace 
Force from the ranch. Soon the streets were patrolled by pink-clad 
sanyassin toting assault rifles. The Peace Force was not passive—
nightly patrols shone brilliant searchlights into the windows of non-
sanyassin residents. On several occasions they forced their way 
inside the homes of outspoken critics of Rajneesh to make threats and 
even arrests.28 
In other words, public funds were not simply paving the road to 
Damascus—they were apparently funding a local version of the 
Spanish Inquisition. 
At the same time, the cult underwent a remarkable overnight 
transformation. Rajneesh had preached for years that religion itself, and 
its rituals and rules, did not exist. He had asked the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) for a permanent U.S. visa under a 
program to license “religious workers.” The INS refused the 
application—since Rajneesh stated that religion did not exist, they 
argued, he could not be a “religious worker.” Almost at once, Rajneesh 
revised his doctrine. From now on, there would be a formal sect entitled 
the Religion of Rajneeshism, complete with designated scriptures, a 
seminary, and a three-level hierarchy of clergy.29 The change proved 
unnecessary—Rajneesh won reversal of the deportation order on 
procedural grounds30—but the dizzying revision of doctrine and order, 
I suspect, made an impression on Frohnmayer. 
 
27 Id. at 23–24. 
28 EPPS, supra note 4, at 75. 
29 Id. at 76. 
30 Id. 
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The entire story of the unraveling of Rajneeshpuram is beyond the 
scope of this essay. But a few key points should be noted. First, the cult 
conducted the first (and so far as I know, only) germ-warfare attack 
ever within the United States, when its members attempted to sway a 
local election by poisoning a local salad bar with salmonella bacilli that 
might sicken anti-Rajneesh voters and keep them away from the 
polls.31 Second, once state authorities obtained a search warrant for 
Rajneeshpuram, they found not only extensive illegal eavesdropping 
tools but also a fully equipped biological-warfare laboratory, with some 
forensic evidence suggesting attempts to weaponize the AIDS virus. 
And, third, during the cult’s death throes, Ma Anand Sheela and others 
commissioned sanyassin assassination teams that were to kill the U.S. 
Attorney Charles Turner, prominent investigative reporter Leslie 
Zaitz,32 and Frohnmayer himself. 
Never having been the target of a criminal assassination conspiracy, 
I cannot make the following statement dogmatically. But I do think 
being such gets the potential victim’s attention and perhaps might spur 
some hard thinking about how the situation arose. From my 
conversations with Frohnmayer, I think that after the Rajneeshpuram 
incident, he reached several unshakeable conclusions about religion 
and public life. First, protestations of goodwill from religious bodies 
and their adherents are to be taken with several grains of salt. Second, 
religion is not a static but a dynamic phenomenon, subject to rapid, 
unpredictable, and sometimes dangerous change. And third, state 
power ceded to the religious leads, more quickly than we might 
imagine, to the potential for blood in the streets. 
The three lessons are, one by one, unassailable. However, as a 
system for evaluating religious freedom claims, they are incomplete. 
That is because Rajneeshpuram involved a specific type of religious 
freedom: a claim by an institutional religious body for privileges under 
and exemptions from the law. Rajneeshpuram was a corporation, with 
enormous wealth behind it and the services of its own in-house law 
firm, headed by a former partner in the Los Angeles superfirm Manatt, 
 
31 See JUDITH MILLER ET AL., GERMS: BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND AMERICA’S SECRET 
WAR 15–23 (2001). 
32 Three decades later, the irrepressible Zaitz became nationally prominent during the 
forty-one-day standoff between law enforcement and a group of self-styled “militiamen” 
who had taken control of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge. E.g., Les Zaitz, Burns 
Residents Confront Militia Over Fears of Violence, OREGONIAN (Jan. 2, 2016, 6:45 PM), 
http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2016/01/burns_residents 
_confront_milit.html. 
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Phelps, Rothenberg & Tunny.33 It was in many ways the equivalent of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, or Hobby Lobby 
Stores. Regulatory and legal concessions to such bodies embue them, 
in effect, with the force of law to work their will on those subject to 
their authority. Usually they do so in a way slightly less malign than 
did the Rajneesh commune; but the reality of institutional power, 
reinforced by legal exemption and tolerance, is formidable. 
Religious freedom claims, however, come in two forms.34 There is 
no question that “the free exercise” of religion must protect, to some 
degree, church bodies. The term itself originally meant a dispensation 
granted by a prince to religious bodies to hold their services—their 
“exercises”35—publicly without fear of reprisal. But there is a second 
form, and it is the form that, until after Smith, almost entirely shaped 
the American constitutional concept of “free exercise.” That second 
form arises when a solitary citizen faces the power of the state with 
nothing—often, as in Al Smith’s case, not even the support of his own 
church structure—but the power of his or her conscience, which 
counsels resistance to some social norm. The quintessential case 
involved unemployment compensation—the very issue presented by 
the facts of Smith—and involved claimants whose faith would not allow 
them to conform their conduct to the dictates of their employer. 
Frohnmayer’s cautions, however well taken with regard to 
institutional claims of free exercise, are best applied warily to 
individual claims. In the latter cases, there is no demand for cession of 
state power to an organized body that will apply it to others. The 
individual simply wants to practice his faith without being 
overwhelmed or penalized by the demands of an unsympathetic 
minority. Such claimants do not seek power at all; they seek protection 
from the power of the state. 
This was the posture of Smith when the Oregon Attorney General’s 
office became involved in it. But the state reacted to Smith and Black’s 
claims as if they were demanding a four-lane state highway to 
Damascus. The state’s opposition to their claims was unyielding. When 
the Oregon Board of Pharmacy sought to defuse the case by changing 
 
33 Rajneeshee Antics Raise Eyebrows in Legal Arena, OREGONIAN (July 11, 1985, 4:10 
PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/rajneesh/index.ssf/1985/07/rajneeshee_antics_raise_eye 
bro.html. 
34 These ideas about “the free exercise of religion” are explored in Garrett Epps, What 
We Talk About When We Talk About Free Exercise, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 563 (1998). 
35 Exercise, n., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/66088 
?rskey=JOvL9L&result=1#eid (last visited Apr. 21, 2016) (see definition 10). 
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the language of the state’s regulations to render religious use of peyote 
non-criminal, Frohnmayer convened a special meeting and insisted 
they reverse it. When the case was nearly settled before oral argument 
in Smith, the state insisted on terms that were rejected by the claimants 
as humiliating and punitive. Whether more generous terms might have 
permitted the settlement to succeed we will never know. What we do 
know is that by the time the case reached the Supreme Court twice, it 
had bypassed a lot of off-ramps. 
The reason why, I think, is that the attorney general, and the state’s 
legal and law enforcement apparatus itself, had come to think in terms 
of the kind of challenge represented by Rajneeshpuram. Certainly that 
conceptual backdrop explains one of the most important moments in 
the state’s preparations for the case. Frohnmayer, during our 
interviews, explained it with great relish; for him it was a fond memory. 
 “Why can’t you argue that the internal controls of the religion are 
sufficient for the state to cede over regulatory authority to the religion 
itself rather than retaining it with the government?” Frohnmayer 
recalls asking himself. “The answer is this—that religions change. 
Once authority to regulate practices is ceded out of government hands 
for all eternity, you have ceded away the possibility of regulating 
something that could become very dangerous. That is a killer 
argument. All of us heard it at the same time and said, ‘That’s a 
killer.’”36 
Frohnmayer built the conclusion of his argument around this trope: 
 And there is a final and critical point here related to our health and 
safety interest. That is that denominational practices, and indeed 
individual believers, even in long-standing religions, can and do 
change. They change the nature of their religious beliefs, they change 
the nature of their doctrine, and that is the very essence of freedom 
of religion and belief. So a constitutional exemption that is bound in 
time and place is very risky. If we exempt a practice, even if we are 
presently satisfied by its safety, control passes forever into private 
hands. And that is proper. But then we must ask, before we let that 
control pass in the form of a constitutional exemption, denomination 
specific or not, now and in the future, what are the contours of that 
exemption and how will it be conferred. Because if the 
denominational or church controls weaken or change, there are still 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights a permanent exemption for the 
practices of that religion.37 
 
36 EPPS, supra note 2, at 209. 
37 Oral Argument at 25:47, Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990) (No. 70-18), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-1213. 
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There is only one problem with this argument. While it applied 
strongly to the Rajneeshpuram situation, it did not apply at all to the 
case at hand. Smith and Black had not asked the Court to exempt peyote 
religion from governmental regulation for all time. First, they were 
seeking only their unemployment compensation—the challenge to the 
criminal penalty for peyote use had been injected into the case by the 
Supreme Court. Second, peyote religion is in fact almost certainly the 
most tightly regulated religious tradition in the United States. The 
growth, harvesting, sale, distribution, and use of peyote takes place 
comfortably inside a web of state and federal regulations—ones that no 
one has challenged in this or any other case. 
The “killer argument” found an echo in the eventual opinion written 
by Justice Scalia in Smith, in which he said that “Respondents urge us 
to hold, quite simply, that when otherwise prohibitable conduct is 
accompanied by religious convictions, not only the convictions but the 
conduct itself must be free from governmental regulation.”38 Of course 
the flesh-and-blood respondents, Smith and Black, made no such 
“simpl[e]” claim for blanket exemption. Governmental regulation was 
not their target. It was, in the first instance, governmental 
discrimination in benefits against those who practice their religion, and, 
after the Court itself had forced the issue, some measure of protection 
by the Constitution when the power of the state decided their religious 
practice should be destroyed by operation of the law. 
In effect, Smith is the last skirmish in the battle of Rajneeshpuram. 
And it has landed us here, in 2016, as the nation tries to make sense out 
of social change—social change that many religious traditions have 
strenuously opposed and indeed have (some at least) vowed to reverse. 
These claimants of religious freedom, by and large, are of the first 
type—bodies such as the Catholic Church—who seek to be able to 
maintain discriminatory treatment of same-sex married couples 
because they object to the laws that allow them to marry; and for-profit 
corporations who wish to deprive their employees of full contraceptive 
coverage because their owners’ religion teaches that some methods are 
sinful. These are demands by the economically powerful that additional 
power be ceded to them by the state, to be wielded over parties not 
represented in the dispute. And in the final irony, the new demand 
being put forward is that state officials themselves must not be required 
to provide state services to same-sex couples if the officials have 
 
38 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990). 
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religious objections to the couples’ lawful, constitutionally protected 
union. 
The demand today is not so much for public funding of the road to 
Damascus as it is that religious bodies be allowed to close the public 
highway altogether and divert objectors onto private roads to 
salvation—or at least to hinder and humiliate and shame, if not prevent 
altogether, from taking a path dictated by their own consciences and 
opened to them by the law and the Constitution. 
What would Frohnmayer make of our situation today? Would he say 
that this is exactly the sort of situation that must arise once we begin 
carving an exempt place in law for religious belief? He would not be 
crass enough to say, “I told you so.” But neither would he be too retiring 
to point out that the sharp response to Smith may have led at least in 
part to our current dilemma. 
God knows I wish that I could talk to him about it. We disagreed on 
every aspect of Smith and its aftermath. I criticized his conduct of the 
case. I told him his ideas on religion were flawed. And being Dave 
Frohnmayer, he heard me out not simply with tolerance but with 
delight. He was the best legal interlocutor I have ever had—creative, 
good-humored, dispassionate, and energetic. I have used this essay to 
put before you, the reader, thoughts I have had since Frohnmayer 
became unavailable. If I present my views on how his own experience 
may have shaped, or even skewed, his legal judgment during briefing 
and argument of Smith, I know he would forgive and even welcome my 
continuation of our long, placid, passionate argument. 
Because he was well acquainted with the finality of death, 
Frohnmayer had complex ideas about the idea of the afterlife. When in 
1999 he suffered a sudden, near-fatal cardiac arrest, he told me later, 
he had no experience of a bright light or spiritual welcome—just 
blackness until he was revived; after which his first thought was that 
he could not die until a cure for Fanconi anemia was found.39 But the 
idea of life after death is not valued as a boon for the dead, but as an 
imagination of the living, and I resist imagining that Dave Frohnmayer 
has disappeared. I suspect that wherever he may be, he is still arguing 
amiably with Blackstone, Vatel, and Chief Justice John Marshall. He 
may, in fact, be serving a term as Attorney General of the Republic of 
Heaven.40 
 
39 EPPS, supra note 4, at 260–62. 
40 See PHILIP PULLMAN, THE AMBER SPYGLASS: HIS DARK MATERIALS 465 (2003). 
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